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Introduction
and Arrow (1973) formalized the idea that education can be used as a signal for innate productivity. If correlated with innate productivity, education alleviates an informational asymmetry between employers and workers concerning the productivity of a worker. Thus, employers use educational signals in the hiring process as a means of predicting expected worker productivity. This process is formally known as signaling.
In search of evidence for the signaling hypothesis, researchers began to investigate how returns to educational signals change with labor market experience. It was conjectured that returns to educational signals should decline with work experience as employers learn about the true productivity of their employees, therefore depreciating the signal's value. However, the analysis of Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) failed to reveal such a pattern. Riley (1979) argued that employers must be right in predicting the true productivities of a group of workers on average. As information about worker productivity is revealed, members of a particular educational signaling group will see their wages improve and others will earn lower wages.
However, if average group productivity remains constant, the predictive value of educational signals is confirmed and returns to educational signals remain unchanged. Farber and Gibbons (1996) present research that incorporates Riley's point. Their theoretical model of employer learning predicts constant returns to educational signals over time. They (like Riley) assume that the productivity of a worker does not depend on the quality of the match between job and worker, implying constant average group productivity. Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) data, they find evidence generally in favor of their theoretical results. Altonji and Pierret (2001) further develop the model of Farber and Gibbons (1996) but arrive, after relaxing informational assumptions, at the conclusion that the value of an educational signal should decrease over time.
1 They also use NLSY79 to substantiate their results. Belman and Heywood (1997) depart from earlier models by assuming that the quality of the match between workers and jobs affects worker productivity, and argue that a sufficient proportion of all jobworker matches are not perfect at the time a worker is hired. This implies that (group) productivity increases over time as the quality of the job-worker match improves. In their framework, workers acquire educational signals and are hired by firms that use those signals to estimate expected productivity. Jobs require a specific level of productivity. However, a high productivity worker matched with a low productivity job will not be able to achieve his full productivity. He faces a job productivity constraint insofar as the job keeps him from realizing his full productive potential. Over time, as information about the true productivity of the employees becomes available, mismatched workers are reassigned to appropriate jobs, and jobworker matches become perfect. Belman and Heywood (1997) find that their model produces declining returns to educational signals over time. They provide empirical evidence using Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
However, none of the aforementioned models addresses the important question of how and when workers' true productivities are revealed, which potentially affects the time paths of returns to educational signals. This paper addresses that shortcoming using a multi-period version of the Belman and Heywood (1997) model, which was chosen because it incorporates the sensible assumption of improved job-matching over time. In the model information in the first period is imperfect but symmetric (neither the worker nor the firm has knowledge of the worker's true productivity). From period two onward, the informational structure of the model changes as workers become privately aware of their true productivities. potentially contain workers of all types, and whose heterogeneity depends on the sampling distribution of the estimator used by the agents. Let α measure the proportion of workers who acquired signal S i and is of type T i (has true productivity v i ). 3 For simplicity I assume that workers who acquire a signal S j and are not of the corresponding true productivity v j are represented in equal proportions in each signaling group. Thus the share of workers of any given true productivity in a signaling group S i that is not of true productivity v i is ( )
After hiring is completed, both employers (profit maximizers) and employees (utility maximizers) are trying to improve their position. There will be perfect matches, undermatched workers (workers have higher productivity than the job requires), or overmatched workers (workers have lower productivities than the job requires).
Workers who are constrained by the job match (undermatched) have an incentive to reveal their true productivity and earn a higher wage in a different firm. 4 Firms have an incentive to detect workers who have a lower productivity than the job requires (overmatched). The ability of workers to reveal their true productivity (firms to detect workers) is assumed to depend on time elapsed since hiring and the means workers/firms possess to reveal/detect mismatches. A sensible assumption seems that both depend on how misplaced a worker is (quality of the jobworker match). Therefore the model assumes that the most undermatched workers are able to reveal their true productivity first, and that the firm is able to detect the most overmatched workers first. 5 Both types of workers move to their appropriate firms where the match is perfect.
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In addition to the theoretical considerations in Stiglitz (2002) , empirical evidence on job matching supports the proposed mechanism. Bartel/Borjas (1981) and Mincer (1986, Part A) find that the wages of quitters (undermatched in the model) usually increase, and that the wages of workers who get laid off (overmatched in the model) usually decrease.
Although the chosen mechanism appears sensible, a cautious reminder seems appropriate.
It is evident that the results in this paper may depend critically on the particular process of generating information assumed here; others processes may lead to different conclusions. The remainder of the section outlines the effect of the revealing/detection process on firm wages, wages to educational signals, and finally on returns to educational signals and their time paths.
Firms are assumed to operate in competitive labor markets. In period 1, the firm F j 's profit maximizing choice is to hire workers who purchased the signal S j . 7 The job match determines the productivity of each worker. A worker matched with a job t j has maximum productivity v j even though his true productivity might be higher. His productivity is constrained by the job match. Workers who are assigned to a job t i and have productivity v j , with i>j, realize productivity v j . Therefore the first period wage in firm j is equal to the expected productivity of the group that purchased the signal S j .
[ ]
The first part of equation 1 shows that the expected productivity of workers with educational signal S j depends on the share of workers with the correct signal (α ), workers facing a job-productivity constraint (first part inside parenthesis), and workers with true productivities less than required by the job. The second part of equation 1 shows an alternative formulation in which expected productivity depends on the productivity of the group of workers for which the job match is perfect and is negatively affected by worker with lower productivity.
From the second period onward, the revealing/detecting process potentially changes firm wages. Assume a model with ten worker types, ten firms and ten educational signals. In period two, workers with educational signal S 10 (working in firm F 10 ) who are of true productivity v 1 are detected. Similarly, workers with educational signal S 1 (working in firm F 1 ) who are of true productivity v 10 are assumed to be able to reveal their true productivity. Both switch to their appropriate firm. In period three, the process continues with workers that are most overmatched/undermatched in that period (i.e. workers that signaled S 10 [S 1 ]and are of true productivity v 2 [v 9 ]). This affects the composition of the workforce in firms F 1 and F 10 and increases the wage in firm F 10 . 8 The general formulation for firms whose wages increase due to the revealing/detection process is
The intuition behind equation 2 is largely the same as in period one, except that some workers have been removed from the firm (as the lower bound of the summation indicates), and workers who are perfect matches were added.
The wage for an educational signal is equal to the average wage of the group possessing that signal. Note that, in period one, the wages to the educational signals are equal to the firm wages because all members of a particular signaling group S j are in firm F j , thus ) positively affects the wage to the signal. However, some of the workers of the signaling group had true productivities below the job requirements, and will, after being detected, work in lower order firms, putting downward pressure on the wage to the signal. As shown below, the relative magnitude of the two effects is crucial to the main result of the paper. 
Note that, as an educational signaling group enters the revealing/detection process (continuing the above example, S 10 in period 2), the adjacent signaling group (i.e. S 9 ) does not.
Therefore, as shown in equation 6, the change in returns to educational signals over time equals the change in the wage to the higher order signal ( ). 
Intuitively, improved matching makes one group unambiguously better off relative to the adjacent group if the adjacent group does not improve their match. This is the case for each signaling group when it first enters the revealing/detection process. Due to their ability to reveal at an earlier date, above median educational signaling groups have a first-mover advantage compared to their adjacent signal (S 10 reveals before S 9 etc.). Before moving on to the empirical section, the generality of the result has to be addressed, since it applies to above median educational signals only. However, in real life this means that it is valid for most post-secondary educational signals. Given the growing importance of post-secondary education in industrialized societies, it is this specificity that should be seen as a strength, not a weakness, of the result.
Empirical Results and Data
The estimation uses five cross-sections (1979, 1985, 1990, 1994, 1998) The CPS started reporting actual degrees in 1992.
11 All preceding years (1979 All preceding years ( , 1985 All preceding years ( , 1990 ) use years of education to construct indicator variables for degrees. 12 The other categories used are LOW (high school degree, Associates degree, some college) and PROF (includes PhDs, law degrees, MDs etc.), and contain the remaining diplomas. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the samples.
The main hypothesis derived from the theoretical section is that above median returns to educational signals increase in the early part of the model. This section forwards empirical evidence for this hypothesis by evaluating the time pattern of diploma (sheepskin) effects popularized by Hungerford and Solon (1987) . It should be pointed out that, in doing so, the paper implicitly assumes that diploma effects (higher returns to education in diploma years) are returns to educational signals, a contention that is not universally accepted.
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The model used regresses the natural log of the real wage on measures of years of education and potential labor market experience and a set of controls. Also included are diploma dummies measuring the diploma (sheepskin) effect and interaction(s) between the diploma effect and potential experience. The latter variable is included to test the prediction of rising returns to educational signals. The basic specification is given is given in equation 8. studies, the diploma effect for the BACH variable is calculated 14 at mean potential experience using the estimates of the full specification in columns 5 and 6. The diploma effect for the model without further controls is 38%, which is slightly lower than the effect estimated by Jaeger and Page (1996) who estimated a diploma effect for the bachelor's degree of 46%. The difference is most likely attributable to the fact that the current study partially includes data in which the exact degree is not reported, lowering the diploma effect as reported by Jaeger and Page (1996) .
Including other controls lowers the diploma effect of the BACH variable to 31%. 
Conclusion
This study provides new insight into the relationship between returns to educational signals and work experience. The paper uses a multi-period model in which additional information about employees' productivity becomes available over time, improving the quality of the job-matches between workers and firms. In contrast to earlier studies, the returns to above median educational signals are found to increase in the early part of the revelation process. This result suggests that the simple view that returns to educational signals decline once complete information is known must be augmented to include a dynamic process with time periods in which returns do not decline. The empirical results are supportive of this finding and indicate periods in which the time paths of returns to educational signals increase.
Endnotes
1 Consider a vector Z that is correlated with true productivity and is observable by the researcher but is not available to the employer. Farber and Gibbons (1996) assume that the educational signal is correlated with the part of Z that is orthogonal to the employer's information at the time of hiring. Altonji and Pierret (2001) relax this assumption so that the educational signal is correlated even with information contained in Z that is available to the employer at the time of hiring. This subtle difference in assumptions produces decreasing returns to educational signals over time.
7 Hiring workers with a higher educational signal will not change the expected average productivity in the firm because of the job productivity constraints, which is not true in a firm with higher job requirements. Thus, even if the firm attempts to hire from a higher educational signal, it will be outbid by firms with higher job requirements. Therefore the profit-maximizing choice is to hire workers from the corresponding educational signaling group.
8 Firm F 1 's wage does not change because it replaces a worker whose productivity was constrained to v 1 with a worker whose true productivity is v 1 . 9 The full model covering all educational signaling groups and all time periods is available from the author on request. 10 The ranges of ages are 1979 (16-22), 1985 (22-28), 1990 (26-33), 1994 (30-37), and 1998 (34-41) .
11 See Jaeger and Page (1996) for a detailed examination of the impact of this change on the level of diploma effects. 12 The BACH variable contains individuals with exactly 16 years of completed education (pre 1992) and individuals with a bachelor's degree (after 1992).
13 It can be argued that the diploma effect represents a return to human capital. This view holds that it is necessary to complete all 4 years of courses of a degree to get all benefits. Thus, a single year of education doesn't account for ¼ of the worth of the acquired degree and the increased return to the fourth year of college is actually a human capital return to completing the degree. An alternative human capital interpretation of diploma effects is offered by Chiswick (1973) and adopted by Lange and Topel (2004) . In their view diploma effects are generated by a selection process that leads students with low returns to education to drop out of school. Only students with high returns to education remain to complete the diploma year. 16-22), 1985 (22-28), 1990 (26-33), 1994 (30-37), 1998 (34-41) to simulate a cohort early in its work life. All estimations use robust standard errors. *, **, *** = statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Derivation of equation 7
When an educational Signal is first affected by the revealing detection process (period 2 for the highest educational signal), its firm wage ( ) and its wage to the signal ( ) change. This is not the case for the wages to signals of lower order. Thus, the change in the return to the educational signal can be expressed as the difference between the wages to the Signal before and after entering the revealing/detection process (as equation 6 in the text shows). Algebraically the difference can be expressed as 
